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ABSTRACT
Applied general equilibrium models with imperfect competition and econom￿ies of scale have been
extensively used for analyzing international trade and development polic￿y issues.  They offer a
natural framework for testing the empirical relevance of propositions fr￿om the industrial
organization and new trade theoretical literature.  This paper warns mod￿el builders and users that
considerable caution is needed in interpreting the results and deriving ￿strong policy conclusions
from these models: in this generation of applied general equilibrium mod￿els, nonuniqueness of
equilibria is not a theoretical curiosum, but a potentially serious prob￿lem.  Disregarding this may
lead to dramatically wrong policy appraisals.
*This paper is forthcoming in Economic Theory.  The views expressed herein are those of the author and not
necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Fede￿ral Reserve System.1.  Introduction*
In his path-breaking contribution to the applied general equilibrium lit￿erature, Harris (1984)
questioned the relevance for policy analysis of models built on the comp￿etitive Arrow-Debreu
framework.  In particular, he suggested that the disappointingly modest ￿evaluations of trade
liberalization effects produced by these models are artifacts of the com￿bined assumptions of price-
taking behavior and constant returns to scale in production, features th￿at real economies rarely
possess.  Building on elements of the new trade theory, he successfully ￿showed this by
introducing strategic price-setting behavior and increasing returns to s￿cale at the individual firm
level in an otherwise standard applied general equilibrium (GE) model ￿of the Canadian economy.
Static applied imperfectly competitive GE models incorporating scale eco￿nomies have since then
been extensively used for analyzing trade liberalization issues, in part￿icular, the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA￿) (e.g., Cox and
Harris (1985), Wigle (1988), Brown and Stern (1989), Markusen and ￿Wigle (1989), Hunter et
al. (1991)) and the European Single Market program (e.g., Gasiorek e￿t al. (1991), Mercenier and
Schmitt (1992), Mercenier (1994)), U.S. foreign trade policy issues￿ (e.g., de Melo and Tarr
(1992)), and developing countries issues (e.g., Devarajan and Rodrik￿ (1991), de Melo and
Roland-Holst (1994)).  The role of these models in the recent NAFTA d￿ebates demonstrates their
potential importance for policy analysis.
For this reason, it is important to call the attention of model builders￿ and users to the fact
that considerable caution is needed in interpreting the results and part￿icularly in deriving policy
conclusions from models of this vintage: in this area of economics, appl￿ied research tends to run
ahead of theory because many conceptual issues remain open.
One such problem arises from the possibility that equilibria may not be ￿unique.  The whole
benchmarking-calibration exercise is on a different logical level in a w￿orld with multiple
equilibria, and it is not clear what the comparative statics policy exer￿cises really mean in such
circumstances.  One should presumably then resort to considerations of h￿istorical conditions and
dynamic stability to pick the "relevant" equilibrium among the set of po￿ssible solutions.
Obviously, nonuniqueness in static applied GE is a potential serious pro￿blem, since modelers can
have little confidence in any policy appraisal from their analysis.  Yet￿, nonconvexities in
* I am particularly indebted to Tim Kehoe both for his comments and for pi￿npointing a flaw in a previous
version of the paper.  I also thank for comments, discussions and/or enc￿ouragements Irma Adelman, Len
Dudley, Robert Gary-Bobo, Rick Harris, Ed Prescott, Jacques Robert, Herb￿ Scarf, T.N. Srinivasan, and an
anonymous referee.  Needless to say, I remain alone responsible for any ￿error or shortcoming.  Financial
support from the FCAR of the Government of Québec and from the SSHRC ￿of the Government of Canada
and hospitality from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis are gratefu￿lly acknowledged.- 2 -
production technologies generically imply that the equilibrium will not ￿be unique, as has been
known for a long time in the theoretical literature.  Despite this, it i￿s remarkable that no case of
multiple equilibria has been reported to be encountered in calibrated ap￿plied GE models with
imperfect competition and economies of scale.  Furthermore, an inspectio￿n of the literature reveals
that applied GE modelers dealing with this vintage of models rarely--if ￿ever--mention the
problem. It is as if they feel that the conclusion, inherited from 20 ye￿ars of practice with
competitive GE models, that "nonuniqueness is largely a theoretical curi￿osum", could safely be
extended to models with imperfect competition and increasing returns to ￿scale.  It is my objective
in this paper to show that this is not the case.1
To do this, I use a calibrated, static large-scale applied GE model of t￿rade and production
with increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition and product diff￿erentiation at the individual
firm level.  The model is a slightly modified version of the one I used ￿in a previous paper
(Mercenier (1994)), and the parameter values are the same (and have￿ therefore not been chosen
for the specific needs of this paper).  As will be clear from the descr￿iption in the next section,
there is nothing pathological about this model even though it is somewha￿t more complex than
most applied GE models of this vintage in the literature.  The trade exp￿eriment that will be
performed mimics the "Europe 1992" integration program.  It consists of ￿forcing a move from an
initial equilibrium with segmented price-discriminated national markets ￿to an equilibrium with
firms selling at a unique price within the European Economic Community (￿EEC).  Though this
experiment, detailed in Section 3, differs from the more usual tariff or￿ tax exercises, it is clearly in
the spirit of the new trade theory; see, e.g., Markusen and Venables (1￿988).  In Section 4, I
report on two different stable equilibrium allocations that have been nu￿merically identified as the
result of the same policy experiment.  The paper closes with a brief con￿clusion.
1  Nonuniqueness of equilibria in competitive economies has been a lurking ￿issue ever since work on applied
GE modeling began in the early 1970s following Scarf (1973). Kehoe (1￿980, 1985a), in particular, provides
index theorems along with explicit formulae for calculations of the inde￿x of an equilibrium in the presence
of production and taxes. However, when translated into economically inte￿rpretable restrictions on the
parameters of a model, the conditions lose their necessity, so that, to ￿date, whether or not nonuniqueness of
equilibria in numerical models of competitive economies is more than a t￿heoretically possible occurrence
remains an open question. See Kehoe (1991) for a recent synthesis. It ￿turns out, however, that except for a
numerical example of a fictitious though reasonably nonpathological econ￿omy produced by Kehoe (1985b),
and despite the very large number of applications, no example of multipl￿e equilibria has been reported in the
literature. Furthermore, Kehoe and Whalley (1985) report on a systemat￿ic exploration of well-known, large-
scale, static competitive models and conclude to unicity, so that most a￿pplied GE modelers regard this
potential nonuniqueness problem largely as a theoretical curiosum. This conclusion, although expedient, is
to a certain extent further confirmed by the numerical investigation of ￿Kehoe (1985c).  Shoven and Whalley
(1984, p. 1015) conclude their discussion on the nonuniqueness issue a￿s follows: "The current working
hypothesis adopted by most modelers seems to be that uniqueness can be p￿resumed for all of the models
discussed here until a clear case of nonuniqueness is found."- 3 -
It should be emphasized that the contribution of this paper is to presen￿t a numerical example
of multiplicity in a model with imperfect competition and economies of s￿cale calibrated on real
world data.  That multiple equilibria may exist in this type of model ha￿s been demonstrated
theoretically (e.g., by Venables (1984) and Kemp and Schweinberger (￿1991)).2  Venables (1984)
in particular develops a model which has the same basic ingredients as m￿ine.  He shows that small
perturbations in the parameters of his model may radically change the nu￿mber and the type of
equilibria.  He also shows, among other things, that if there are multip￿le equilibria, there are
multiple stable equilibria.  My paper demonstrates that the theoretical ￿insight provided by
Venables is of practical importance.
2.  The Model
2.a  An overview
The world economy consists of six countries/regions: Great Britain (GB), the Federal
Republic of Germany (G), France (Fr), Italy (It), the rest of the EEC (RE) and the rest of the
OECD (ROW).3  All countries are fully endogenous and have the same structure.  Each ￿country
has nine sectors of production, of which four are perfectly competitive;￿ see Table 1.  In the latter
sectors, countries are linked by an Armington system.4  The other five industries are
noncompetitive, with firms assumed symmetric within national boundaries.￿  They operate with
fixed primary factor costs and therefore face increasing returns to scal￿e in production.  They have
no monopsony power on any market for inputs, primary or intermediate.
Each individual oligopolist produces a different good.  The game between￿ noncompetitive
firms is Nash in sales.  Industry structure is endogenous à la Chambe￿rlain: costless entry and exit
ensure zero oligopolistic profits.  The instantaneous GE concept adopted￿ is a compromise in
terms of informational requirements between the primitive conjectural-Co￿urnot-Nash-Walras
equilibrium of Negishi (1961) and the objective-Cournot-Nash-Walras eq￿uilibrium introduced by
Gabszewicz and Vial (1972).5  Namely, noncompetitive firms are endowed with the knowledge
of preferences and technologies of their clients, which they use in maxi￿mizing profits.  They are,
however, assumed to neglect the feedback effect of their decisions on th￿eir profits via income (the
2  I thank a referee for bringing those papers to my attention.
3  The model is calibrated on a 1982 data base, and region RE actually represents the rest of the EEC-10
partners, and not the 12 present members of the EEC.  For details on the￿ data base, calibration procedure and
parameter values, see Mercenier (1994).
4 The Armington assumption has been a standard feature of competitive GE t￿rade models; see Shoven and
Whalley (1984), Srinivasan and Whalley (1986).  Although it is incre￿asingly criticized--see Norman (1990)--
it has been adopted here in order to keep the treatment of the competiti￿ve side of the model as standard as
possible.
5  See also the surveys by Gary-Bobo (1989), Bonanno (1990) and Benassy￿ (1991).- 4 -
Ford effect) and input-output multipliers (the Nikaido (1975) effect￿).6  Because of the presence of
various forms of nontariff barriers (NTBs) within Europe, national eco￿nomies are initially
assumed segmented, with noncompetitive firms acting as price-discriminat￿ing oligopolists; see,
e.g., Brander (1981).
Final demand decisions are made in each country by a single representati￿ve utility-
maximizing agent.  A detailed country- and sector-specific system of pri￿ce-responsive
intermediate demands is specified.  All components of demand--final as w￿ell as intermediate--
recognize differences in products from individual oligopolistic firms, à￿ la Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) and
Ethier (1982).  Both preferences and technologies, therefore, have inc￿reasing returns to varieties,
so that product diversity affects not only household utility but also pr￿oduction efficiency in all
sectors, competitive and noncompetitive.  Both production factors move f￿reely across sectors,
with capital being internationally mobile and European labor and labor o￿wners being mobile
within the EEC.  The model is static: our focus is on induced reallocati￿ons of existing resources,
and we do not deal with factor accumulation.
2.b  A formal presentation
Sectors of activity are identified by indices s,tÎS with S=CÈC where C and C denote,
respectively, the subset of competitive and noncompetitive industries.  ￿Countries are identified by
indices i,jÎW with W= EECÈROW, where the first subset represents the European Economic
Community and the second the rest of the world.  We keep track of the tr￿ade flows by identifying
the first two indices with, respectively, the country and the industry s￿upplying the good and,
when appropriate, the next two with the purchasing country and industry.￿7
Households
Domestic final demand decisions in country i are made by a single representative household.
It values competitively produced goods from different countries as imper￿fect substitutes (the
Armington assumption) while it treats goods produced in oligopolistic s￿ectors as firm-specific.
6  This partial equilibrium compromise obviously simplifies the computation￿s.  It has also been advocated in
the theoretical literature (Hart 1985, p.121) to avoid nonexistence pr￿oblems highlighted by Roberts and
Sonnenschein (1977) and Dierker and Grodal (1986).  The implication ￿of such an assumption, however, is
that firms are modeled as making their strategic decisions with systemat￿ic errors.  This is certainly
something that a GE modeler should want to avoid.  The question is, of c￿ourse, whether in GE models
calibrated on real world data, nonexistence is indeed a serious problem.￿  As a corollary question, are the
systematic errors that have been arbitrarily built into the oligopolists￿' behavior of enough significance to
affect the model's prediction when a policy experiment is performed?  Th￿ese are important empirical issues
that, to the best of my knowledge, have never been addressed.
7 A  subscript  isjt therefore indicates a flow originating in sector s of country i with industry t of country j as
recipient.- 5 -
This is represented by a two-level utility function.  The first level co￿mbines consumption goods
(c.si) assuming constant expenditure shares (rsi).  The second level determines the optimal
composition of the consumption aggregates in terms of geographical origi￿n if the sector is
competitive or in terms of the individual firms' products if the sector ￿is noncompetitive.  If we
assume that the njs oligopolistic firms operating in country j's industry s share the same
technology and have equal market shares (the symmetry assumption),8 the household's
preferences are represented as follows:
Ui    =     rsi  log c.si å
sÎS
 ,                           rsi = 1, å
sÎS
(1)     c.si    =     djsi  cjsi
ss-1




s s-1,                sÎC,
          c.si    =     njs  djsi  cjsi
ss-1




s s-1,          sÎC,
where djsi are share parameters and ss are substitution elasticities.  Note that when sÎC, cjsi
represents the sales of the whole industry s of country j, whereas when sÎC, it denotes the sales
of a single representative firm.  For nontraded goods, djsi=0 "j¹i.
The household supplies labor and capital services from which it earns it￿s income
Yi = wi SsLis + rKi
sup.  Observe from the notation that both primary factors move costlessly
across sectors; furthermore, capital is internationally mobile whereas l￿abor and labor owners are
assumed to move freely within the EEC.  Final demands cjsi of country i result from maximization
of (1) subject to the following budget constraint:
(2)      pjsi cjsi å
sÎC




   £   wi SsLis + rKi
sup,
where p denotes prices.
Firms
Competitive industries.   In competitive industries, the representative firm of country i-
sector s operates with constant returns-to-scale technologies, combining variabl￿e capital (Kis
v),
labor (Lis
v) and intermediate inputs (xjtis) to produce Qis.  The treatment of material inputs in the
production function is analogous to that of consumption goods in househo￿lds' preferences:
8  Note that this assumption implies that oligopolists operating in the sam￿e country and sector charge identical
prices.- 6 -
competitively produced goods from different geographical origins enter a￿s imperfect substitutes
whereas oligopolistically produced goods are recognized as firm-specific￿.  Formally:
          log Qis    £    aLis  log Lis
v   +   aKis  log Kis
v   +    atis  log x.tis å
tÎS
 ,
(3)     x.tis    =     bjtis  xjtis
st-1




st-1  ,                 tÎC,
          x.tis    =     njt  bjtis  xjtis
st-1




st-1  ,          tÎC,
where as and bs are share parameters with
aLis + aKis +  atis å
tÎS
  = 1 
and bjtis=0 "j¹i  if t is nontraded.9  Input demands result from minimizing variable costs vis for
given output levels Qis:
(4)     vis Qis    =    pjti xjtis å
tÎC




   +   wiLis
v + rKis
v
subject to (3), which implies marginal cost pricing: pisj=vis.
Noncompetitive industries.   Noncompetitive firms have increasing returns to scale in
production: in addition to variable costs associated with technological ￿constraints similar to (3),
they face fixed primary factor costs.  This introduces a wedge between a￿verage (Vis) and marginal
(vis) costs:
(5)     Vis   =    vis   +    wiLis
F  +  rKis
F
Qis
 ,          sÎC,
where Qis, Lis
F, Kis
F denote, respectively, the individual firm's output, fixed labor and fixed
capital.
With initial market segmentation, the noncompetitive firm exploits the m￿onopoly power it
has on each individual country market.  To establish this, the firm is e￿ndowed with the knowledge
of preferences (1) and technologies (3) of its clients.  It then per￿forms a partial equilibrium profit
9  Observe that although goods enter preferences (1) and technologies (3￿) with the same degree of differentiation
(the ss are assumed identical by lack of evidence otherwise), price responsiv￿eness will not be the same
because the share parameters are different: the bs are sector-specific.- 7 -
maximization calculation assuming that in each country, each individual ￿client's current-price
expenditure on the whole industry is unaffected by its own strategic action zisj, so that
(6)     
¶rsjYj
¶zisj
  =  0,  j =1,...,W,        and        
¶asjtvjtQjt
¶zisj
  =  0,  j =1,...,W ,  t =1,...,S .
We make the Cournot assumption of noncooperative behavior with sales to ￿each individual market
as the strategic variables zisj.  Profit maximization then yields that
(7)     
pisj - vis
pisj
    =   
¶log pisj
¶log zisj
 ,          sÎC,
with
(8)     Qis    =    zisj å
jÎW
.
The computation of the elasticities on the right side of (7) requires ￿inverting log-linearized
aggregate demand systems.  This is a very complex calculation; see the A￿ppendix for details.
Costless entry/exit ensures that oligopolists make zero profits:
(9)     VisQis - p isj  zisj å
jÎW
  =  0,          sÎC.
General equilibrium
A general equilibrium is an allocation, supported by a vector of prices ￿(pisj,wi,r),
sÎS,  i,j ÎW, such that
-  Households maximize (1) subject to (2);
-  Firms minimize (4) subject to (3);
-  Oligopolistic firms set prices according to (7) and satisfy the resu￿lting demand so that
(10)    zisj    =    cisj + x isjt å
tÎS
,          sÎC,  i,jÎW,
and (8) holds;- 8 -
- Industry concentration--as summarized by the real variable nis--is such that
noncompetitive firms earn no pure profits; i.e., conditions (5) and (￿9) are satisfied.10
For the pricing equation (7) to make sense requires that the equilibri￿um number of firms
nis be greater than one:
(11)    nis   ³  1,      sÎC;
  -  Supply equals demand in each competitive market:




 ,          sÎC,  iÎW ;
(13)     Ki
sup å
iÎW
   =    Kis
v å
sÎC






 ,    with Ki
sup fixed;
(14a)    Li
sup    =      Lis å
sÎS
    =      Lis
v å
sÎC




 ,     iÎROW ,
(14b)    wi
pci
   =   
wj
pcj
 ,      i,jÎEEC ,
(14c)    LEEC




    =    Lis
v å
sÎC







where pc refers to the consumption price index and Lsup to exogenously given labor stocks.
The ROW wage rate is chosen as the numéraire.11  Calibration of the model to a base-year
data set is made difficult because of equation (7).  It requires the j￿oint determination of the
10 The treatment of nis as a real rather than an integer variable is widespread both in the theo￿retical trade
literature and in the applied GE literature (for the latter, Mercenier ￿and Schmitt (1992) is a notable
exception).  The reason for this is that it drastically simplifies both￿ the analytics and the computations.
(One would otherwise have to resort to mixed-integer programming techni￿ques which are presently unable to
handle large-scale nonlinear problems.)  Though quite innocuous for man￿y sectors where nis is large, such an
assumption may be thought to make little sense for highly concentrated i￿ndustries.  One has to consider,
however, that the hypothesis is made jointly with that of symmetry, so t￿hat, in any case, firms are abstract
objects.  One should therefore regard nis as an index of product variety rather than, strictly speaking, as a
number of real world firms.
11 It is well known that price normalization matters in the objective-Courn￿ot-Nash-Walras GE model; see
Gabszewicz and Vial (1972).  This raises important questions concernin￿g the theoretical consistency of the
Cournot-Walras construction.  Ginsburgh (1994) has recently called att￿ention to the issue by producing a
numerical example in which manipulating the numéraire may be more wel￿fare-improving than removing
market imperfections such as consumer taxes.  If we disregard theoretica￿l consistency issues, a practical way
out of this numéraire problem is to choose a normalization rule that ￿involves only competitive prices.  In
addition, we consider only zero-profit equilibria which are, as shown by￿ Kletzer and Srinivasan (1994),
immune to changes in the normalization rule.- 9 -
markups and scale elasticities consistent with observed base-year expend￿itures and optimal price
discrimination; see Mercenier (1994) for details.
3.  The Trade Experiment: Completing the European Single Market
Following Smith and Venables' (1988) formalization of the completion o￿f a single market in
Europe, the numerical experiment consists of forcing individual firms to￿ switch from their initial
segmented-market pricing strategy to an integrated-market pricing strate￿gy determined from their
average EEC-wide monopoly power.12
The rationale underlying this experiment is the following.  Although tar￿iffs within Europe
are negligible, significant NTBs subsist, taking various more-or-less pe￿rnicious forms such as
norms, government procurement policies and security regulations.13  These barriers confer to
firms the power to price-discriminate among national markets.  The objec￿tive of the "Europe
1992" program is to restore cross-border arbitraging by suppressing all ￿forms of NTBs.  Firms
would then be forced to charge a unique price within the EEC.  Quantifyi￿ng these effects is
difficult because NTBs are essentially unobservable.14  The modeling strategy adopted treats
these NTBs as latent variables underlying market segmentation within the￿ community in the pre-
"1992" equilibrium.  We infer from the data set the price system consist￿ent with optimal price
discrimination by oligopolistic firms and interpret these as resulting f￿rom the implicit structure of
NTBs.  The policy experiment then consists of forcing individual firms t￿o adopt single-pricing
within Europe, determined from their average EEC-wide monopoly power, an￿d interpreting this
behavioral change as the optimal strategic reaction to the elimination o￿f the implicit NTBs.
Formally, we rewrite the pricing equation (7) as
pisj - vis
pisj
    =   l   
¶log pisj
¶log zisj
  +  (1 - l)  ¶log pisEEC
¶log zisEEC
 ,          sÎC,
where pisEEC and zisEEC denote, respectively, prices and sales to a single Europe-wide market.
The model is calibrated with l =1; market integration is implemented by setting l =0.  See the
Appendix for details on the numerical evaluation of ¶log pisEEC/¶log zisEEC.
4.  Results
12 The "Europe 1992" integration program aims at the abolition of all barri￿ers to movements of goods and
production factors within the EEC.  It includes explicit efforts to ease￿ labor mobility, a feature that we have
taken into account by our modeling of the factor markets.
13  See, e.g., CEC (1988) for an extensive identification of these barrier￿s.
14  It is, of course, well known that there is no such thing as a tariff-equ￿ivalence to NTBs in a noncompetitive
environment.- 10 -
Table 2 documents two equilibrium allocations predicted by the model ￿for the same policy
experiment.15 These spectacular results speak clearly for themselves, and I make only￿ a few
comments.
(1) Both equilibria have been conclusively tested for local stability in the￿ sense that when started
from initial values generated by ±1% random perturbations of equilibrium allocations and prices,
the (Newton-type) algorithm converges back to the same equilibrium.
(2) The two equilibria have been obtained by forcing the algorithm on differ￿ent search paths by
randomly choosing the competitive market-equilibrium condition that is b￿eing dropped thanks to
Walras' law.  Needless to say, that the model satisfies Walras's law is ￿verified by checking that at
the solution allocations and prices, all markets clear and all agents ar￿e on their budget constraints.
(3) It should be emphasized that it would be heroic to infer that the model ￿has only two
equilibria from the fact that I have been unable to produce more than tw￿o.  As is made clear
above, one has to resort to ad hoc trial and error-type explorations, mo￿st trial shots ending with
the algorithm blowing out of numerical control.  It is likely that, were￿ it possible to exert a fuller
control on the algorithm so that one could monitor the numerical search ￿more widely in the
feasible space, additional equilibria would be found.  More generally, I￿ want to suggest that
nonuniqueness may well be the general rule rather than the exception in ￿this generation of GE
models and that if cases of multiple equilibria have not been encountere￿d before, it has more to do
with the limitations of our numerical abilities and techniques than with￿ the properties of the
models.
(4)  An extensive investigation of the case with fixed industry structure (n￿amely, the number of
firms is held fixed and oligopolistic profits are not necessarily zero a￿nymore) has failed to
produce more than one equilibrium.16  This suggests that the Chamberlinian assumption of
costless entry/exit could be a potential source of multiplicity (which ￿can hardly be surprising
given that preferences and production technologies exhibit increasing re￿turns to the number of
15 In a previous version of this paper, I reported four different solution ￿allocations.  Tim Kehoe brought to my
attention that two of these were in fact infeasible, since some computed￿ nis  were smaller than unity.
Condition (11) has been added to the model, and the results reported h￿ere do satisfy the constraint.
All computations have been performed using GAMS/MINOS (Brooke et al. (￿1988)), which is the most
popular software among GE modelers.  GAMS/MINOS uses a projected Lagrang￿ian algorithm; see Murtagh
and Saunders (1982).
The database, the code and the detailed equilibrium values for allocatio￿ns, prices and parameters are available
from the author upon request (before one year past the date of publicat￿ion of the paper) preferably by E-mail
(mercenie@plgcn.umontreal.ca) or by mail (CRDE, Universite de Montrea￿l, CP 6128, Suc. A, Montreal,
H3C 3J7, Canada) if a disk is supplied with the request.
16  Needless to say, budget constraints (2) have then been appropriately a￿mended to include profits on the
income side.- 11 -
varieties).  This is troublesome if one bears in mind that this mechani￿sm is a cornerstone of the
rationalization of production effects forcefully stressed by Harris (19￿84) in his evaluations of the
positive welfare gains for Canada of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreemen￿t.  A proviso,
however: the factor mobility assumption may not be innocuous either; it ￿could well be a necessary
condition (certainly not a sufficient one, according to my numerical te￿sts) for making the
multiplicity apparent (see Helpman and Krugman (1985, section 10.3))￿.  The theoretical insight
provided by Venables (1984) suggests, however, that the problem is pot￿entially serious even with
fixed national factor endowments.
(5) The two identified equilibria cannot be Pareto-ranked.
 5.  Conclusion
The existence of multiple equilibria in models of international trade wi￿th imperfect
competition is not novel.  Yet, the problem seems to have been largely i￿gnored by applied GE
modelers, or at least its importance has been underestimated.  This pape￿r has shown that
nonuniqueness is a potentially serious problem in models that are curren￿tly being used for policy
analysis.  My contribution has been to present a numerical example of mu￿ltiplicity in a rather
standard (though admittedly more sophisticated than usual) large-scale￿ applied GE model
calibrated on real world data.
In the specific model presented here, the source of the nonuniqueness re￿sult seems to be in
the assumption of costless entry and exit of firms.  This is troubling g￿iven that this Chamberlinian
mechanism plays an important role in many applied GE models of this vint￿age.  It is in particular a
cornerstone of the rationalization of production effects forcefully stre￿ssed by Harris (1984).
What is the appropriate methodological response to this nonuniqueness pr￿oblem?  There is
no easy answer to this question because many conceptual issues remain un￿addressed.  A full-
fledged dynamic theory of oligopolistic markets would certainly help to ￿solve the nonuniqueness
problem.  Since such a theory is not yet available despite recent progre￿ss (e.g., Maskin and Tirole
(1987, 1988a,b)), considerable caution should be used in deriving str￿ong policy conclusions from
these models.- A1 -
Appendix:   The computation of oligopolistic markups
a)   The segmented market case
The difficulty in this exercise is that one has to keep track of individ￿ual firms' variables.
Let us define Pj as the vector of prices on market j:
         Pj









f is the price charged by firm f of country i .  (For notational convenience, we neglect
the subscript s.)  Define in a similar way Zj, C j, X jt as the vectors of sales (zij
f), consumption
(cij
f) and input demands by sector t (xijt
f ).  On market j, firms face a demand system that,
according to assumptions (6), is of the following form:
(A1)   Zj  =  Cj(Pj(Zj))  +   Xjt(Pj(Zj)) S
t
 .
Total differentiation yields that
        dZj  =  
¶Cj
¶Pj








where ¶Cj/¶Pj, ¶Xjt/¶Pj, ¶Pj/¶Zj are matrices of partial derivatives.  Define Pj as the diagonal
matrix with the pij
f as diagonal elements and Cj, X jt, Zj in a similar way.  It is then trivial to
transform the previous system to exhibit elasticities:
   dZj  =  
¶Cj
¶Pj
  Pj Cj
-1 Cj Zj








-1 Zj  
¶Pj
¶Zj
  dZj ,
(A2)          =    e(Cj,Pj)Cj Zj
-1  +   e(Xjt,Pj) Xjt Zj
-1 S
t
 . e(Pj,Zj) dZj .
Noncooperative behavior implies that firm f solves this system with dzij
f = 1 and all other
elements of dZj set to zero.  This yields the value of the right-side term of (7) for￿ firm f.
Conceptually, the computation of an equilibrium requires solving one suc￿h system for each firm
to all destination markets.  The cost of such a calculation would be pro￿hibitive without the
assumption of symmetry between domestic firms.
To work a tractable formula, we introduce the following notation for cro￿ss-elasticities:- A2 -
      
eij
k   =   
¶log  cij











          }  fÎi, gÎk, f¹g
and identify the corresponding own-elasticities by a tilde (~):
      
eij
i   =   
¶log  cij











          }  fÎi .
Observe that yij
i is the variable on the right side of the pricing equation (7).  There￿ is a simple
relationship between own- and cross-elasticities:
(A3)  
eij
i   =   eij
i  -  s
yij
i   =   yij
i  -  1
s
which reduces by one the dimension of the system (A2).  From this and ￿the symmetry
assumption, it can then be shown by standard though tedious algebra that￿ the system (A2) takes
the following form:




  -  s yhj




),         h = 1,...,W,
where dki   =  {
1   if k = i,
0   if k ¹ i .
An analytical expression for the cross-price elasticities ehj
k  is easily derived from
preferences (1), technologies (3) and assumptions (6):
(A5)  ehj
k    =    s - 1   
chj





  +  
xhjt




ajt vjt Qjt å
t
.
Solving (A4) and (A5) for h = 1,...,W, and making use of (A3), one obtains the value of the
right side of (7).  This calculation has to be performed "i,j ÎW, in each noncompetitive sector
s ÎC.- A3 -
b)   The integrated market case
The only difference between the segmented and integrated market cases is￿ that in the latter
one has to deal with the EEC-aggregate demand system rather than with de￿mands from
individual countries.  System (A4) remains essentially unchanged (mar￿ket j now representing
the aggregate EEC market), but the price elasticities are now weighted ￿averages of those of
individual countries:
(A6)  ehEEC
k      =      
ehj














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Numerical Results of the 'Europe 1992' Experiment
(% deviations w. r. to calibrated segmented market equilibrium)
Equilibrium # 1
GB G Fr It RE ROW
Real income -12.74 6.33 -6.08 1.61 13.71 -0.03
Wage rate 4.83 -1.13 2.23 0.03 -0.91 0.00
Rental rate of capital 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48
Cost of living index 4.26 -1.66 1.68 -0.51 -1.45 0.24
Employment -21.34 8.84 -10.48 1.61 26.17 0.00
Output
Pharmaceutics -36.13 28.09 -16.21 1.93 24.41 -0.43
Chemicals (nonpharm.) -29.78 20.60 -15.06 1.39 19.95 -0.51
Motor vehicles -18.65 2.45 -16.19 15.73 121.82 -1.54
Office machinery -66.31 13.38 -42.35 4.48 309.64 -2.99
Other mach. & transp. -34.78 16.62 -22.63 2.81 114.76 -0.77
Number of firms
Pharmaceutics -34.90 22.71 -15.97 0.03 21.06 -0.40
Chemicals (nonpharm.) -27.66 16.76 -14.40 0.56 18.78 -0.47
Motor vehicles -31.19 -7.58 -13.98 7.54 78.18 -0.75
Office machinery -67.99 -0.30 -46.23 -19.11 266.29 -2.87
Other mach. & transp. -33.87 14.30 -23.33 0.95 106.95 -0.75
Equilibrium # 2
GB G Fr It RE ROW
Real income 2.79 6.13 -5.73 1.21 -2.89 -0.02
Wage rate 0.37 -0.52 2.72 0.61 1.80 0.00
Rental rate of capital 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
Cost of living index -0.44 -1.32 1.89 -0.19 0.98 0.14
Employment 3.82 8.62 -9.77 1.06 -6.09 0.00
Output
Pharmaceutics 5.80 22.13 -16.61 0.59 -6.42 -0.60
Chemicals (nonpharm.) 5.75 18.14 -14.12 1.17 -6.65 -0.47
Motor vehicles 28.14 5.37 -14.97 14.40 -2.63 -1.16
Office machinery 13.52 23.02 -37.17 7.93 -52.14 -0.02
Other mach. & transp. 6.94 17.64 -18.86 2.70 -23.05 -0.48
Number of firms
Pharmaceutics 2.31 17.45 -16.44 -1.08 -8.26 -0.58
Chemicals (nonpharm.) 4.49 14.72 -13.50 0.48 -7.14 -0.44
Motor vehicles 6.57 -3.39 -10.31 9.15 -5.80 -0.53
Office machinery 1.61 8.45 -41.59 -15.43 -54.92 -0.04
Other mach. & transp. 5.34 15.36 -19.60 0.92 -23.31 -0.44